A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, 1876-1878.
By George Hoover Rupp.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge
1941
Рецензии от:
1. Malbone W. Graham (The American Journal of International Law, 1942)
2. David Harris (The Slavonic and East European Review. American Series, 1943)
3. John Hunziker (The Journal of Modern History, 1942)
4. A. J. P. Taylor (The English Historical Review, 1943)
5. Walter G. Wirthwein (The American Historical Review, 1943)
1. Malbone W. Graham (The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, 4, 1942, pp. 741-742)
To its brilliant collection of pieces of historical research the Department of History at Harvard University has now added this elaborately documented study of a critical period in the diplomacy of the major European Powers. The treatment is meticulously detailed, with utilization of much fresh archival material from Imperial and Soviet Russian sources, as also from the Vienna Archives. To these are added hitherto untouched materials of Hungarian provenience. As a result, the many-sided personalities in the drama are revealed in full and definitive perspective. While the author focuses on the records of official diplomacy, gathered together in orthodox fashion, it is gratifying to note that he is aware of, although he does not fully disclose, the activities of the protagonists of full-fledged independence for the still subjugated nationalities of the Ottoman Empire. One glimpses intermittently in these pages the evidences of the international a-morality of the period; there is incremental testimony and record of the way in which peoples were handed about utterly without reference to their wishes. Only the Russians appear as the exponents of national liberation, the policies of the other Powers being strangely unreceptive to the idea of real independence for the Balkan peoples. One must ultimately attribute to the blindness of prestige diplomacy the failure of statesmen to effect in 1878 a settlement which would have avoided recurring threats to the peace of Europe, such as the Bosnian crisis, and ultimate disasters such as Serajevo. Only after Versailles followed by Munich does the terrible price paid for “peace with honor” at Berlin, after the rejection of a nationality peace like that of San Stefano, became clear.
Dr. Rupp unhappily oscillates between a somewhat uncritical admiration for Bismarck and Andrassy (read Ribbentrop and Bardossy) and an intermittent realization of how they frustrated nationality movements which have since come to fruition. Not since the days of Aehrenthal has any responsible statesman held the view of the author that “to have effected a real and lasting solution of the Balkan problem in conjunction with Russia would have been a piece of real statesmanship” (p. 181). To believe that Austria and Russia could have arrived at “a permanent bargain . . . which would have removed the clash of the two Empires here in the East for all time” (p. 194) appears, in the retrospect of more than three score years, a judgment of an exceptionally naive character. It is to be hoped that, should Dr. Rupp continue his work in this field, he will find, from an examination of the force and trend of nationality movements, much to correct his perspective. There is still a great deal to be done in authentically documenting, even from musty archives, little-known phases in the process of resurgent nationality.
Malbone W. Graham
2. David Harris (The Slavonic and East European Review. American Series, Vol. 2, 1, 1943, pp. 252-254)
Dr. Rupp, who contributed a very useful article on the Reichstadt agreement to the thirtieth volume of the American Historical Review (1925), now presents a bibliographically up-to-date version of the larger work originally inspired by the late Professor Coolidge. It is yet another addition to the now considerable shelf of studies devoted to various aspects of the portentous Balkan crisis of the 1870’s, and, like so many of its predecessors on this shelf, it is a monograph of more interest to other scholars than to the hypothetical layman.
The author has given himself the task, as the title indicates, of following the ups-and-downs of Austro-Russian relations from Reichstadt to the Congress of Berlin, two years later. The theme inescapably presents to the student a difficult problem since the agreements and disagreements between Vienna and St. Petersburg were only a part, however important, of an issue on which were focussed the opinions and actions of numerous other actors. Had the presupposition that went into the League of the Three Emperors been realized, Prince Bismarck would have ratified the decisions arrived at by Count Andrassy and Prince Gorchakov, and Balkan affairs would have been settled accordingly. There turned out to be, however, two vexations not fully anticipated. The first of these was revealed in the periodic importunities and cajoleries addressed to Berlin from Vienna and St. Petersburg when Austrian and Russian authorities fell into discord. The second vexation lay in the unwillingness manifested by other states to have their interests, real or visionary, ignored by the imperial alliance. Into any story of the dealings between Austria-Hungary and Russia must consequently come some discussion of the activity and inactivity of the professed “honest broker” and some attention to the willful independence displayed in London and lesser places. A complete illumination of these complexities would require blending the special theme into an account of the whole crisis. Some course short of that procedure is not at all impossible, although there would be divergence of opinion as to how best it should be followed. Dr. Rupp has been on the alert for these impingements on his theme and has devoted much attention to the roles of Prince Bismarck and the various significant British participants. The non-intensive treatment of ancillary problems has perhaps here been more successful in the case of the one man with a fairly consistent policy than in that of several Englishmen who rang a variety of changes.
Dr. Rupp has been interested in frequently presenting interpretations of motives and objectives of the several important individuals and of the states concerned in the negotiations. One who has snuffled among many of the same sources might wish to cavil at times over small points of fact and conclusion, but it would be difficult to contest the validity of the broad view, already advanced by Mr. B. H. Sumner and others, of a Russian hierarchy belabored by cross-purposes and confusions. Nor can one, so far as I know, challenge Dr. Rupp’s picture of a Count Andrassy whose would-be sharpness led to much and tragic bungling. The author makes one aware of the fact that almost any decision augured trouble of some kind for the Habsburg Monarchy and that the foreign minister was not of sufficient stature for his place. He has added his share to the judgment against Wertheimer’s portrayal of the great statesman who triumphed over cunning and wickedness.
To accumulate his extensive and valuable bibliography the author has ranged far and wide. He has used materials from the Public Record Office and from the Staatsarchiv. He has, moreover, justly claimed virtue for exploiting a treasury of printed Russian sources which are all the more precious because the Russian archives have been inaccessible to western scholars.
The organization of such a study is difficult at best and there is undoubtedly much subjectivity in a critic’s assessment. It is necessary to say, however, that the author’s solution of the problem has not been eminently successful, particularly in the earlier parts of the book. The flow of the narrative is hampered, it seems to me, by these difficulties of organization and by the concern for interpretation which has led to noticeable repetitions. The style of writing is clear and undoubtedly it is only the barnacled conservative who will take exception to an occasional resort to slang. There is now and then a careless usage which betrays a distraction. I hope it will not be deemed unfair to quote from page 433 the book’s least felicitous sentence: “The military situation of Russia was, vis-à-vis Austria, far from rosy, for it was mid-winter and her army in the Balkans was parted by the Balkan Mountains, which could be crossed only through snow-filled, impassable paths.”
David Harris,
Stanford University.
3. John Hunziker (The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 14, 3, 1942, pp. 387-389)
Dr. Rupp has made a detailed analysis of Russo-Austrian relations from 1876 to 1878. To furnish entertainment of a scholarly nature in his labor he has concentrated biographical material of the chief Russian and Austrian diplomats of the period. Whether reading for pleasure or for serious study, this book is very worth while to students of Balkan history. Fulfilling a long-felt need, Mr. Rupp has used the printed Russian material but has not pursued his study in the Russian archives, which is a source that should be exploited sometime. Yet he has gone further than any other student, up to the time of his writing, in utilizing Moscovite sources as well as the Austrian archives, and also in using some Hungarian source material.
The author has as the theme for his book the breakup of the close friendship between Russia and Austria from 1876 to 1878. In chapter i he has studied the basis for an entente between the two powers nearest and most interested in the Balkan Peninsula. Their need for an understanding was hastened by the development of the revolution of 1875 in Bosnia and Herzegovina against Turkey. Out of this situation came the meeting at Berlin in May, 1876, of the German, Russian, and Austrian diplomats. The necessity to reach an understanding as to the division of the Turkish estate between Austria and Russia brought about the Reichstadt agreement in July, 1876, which apparently permitted Russian influence in the Balkans except in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Austria had her interest recognized. This agreement, along with the way the Russian and Austrian diplomats set it down upon paper, provided opportunity for misunderstandings and recriminations which the author carefully examines.
Germany played an important role in this period of wavering friendship. As Bismarck saw the situation, Germany had to be protected from a French war of revenge. Having this possibility in mind, he could not give up Russian friendship, nor could he see Austria overwhelmed by Russia. Both powers sought his strong support. Bismarck’s unenviable position made even more possible the futility of Gorchakov’s search for a European mandate to solve the Balkan difficulties. Arising out of this failure and the need to clarify the application of the Reichstadt convention, the Budapest conventions were made in January, 1877, before Russia went to war with Turkey in that year. Significantly, the influence of nationalism in Russia forced the autocratic tsar into war for his brother-Slavs. And yet he was willing to bargain away the Bosnians—for a price.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 brought with it a series of diplomatic involvements, and finally Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, was upset when the Treaty of San Stefano became known. For him this situation was eased by England’s threatening activity concerning the outcome of the Russo-Turkish war. Until this treaty was known, Andrassy felt no great need of watching its negotiation, since he had already obtained, in a general way, what he wanted for Austria, namely, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
But the creation of the larger Bulgaria, the Russian failure to consult with Austria about peace terms in March of 1878, and the brusque actions of Ignatyev—all finally caused Austria to join Disraeli in an effort to restrict Russia. On the other hand, Bismarck had not measured up to Russian expectations in repaying the debt of 1870-71 and had supported Austria. By the time of the Congress of Berlin, Austria and Russia had reached the end of their intimate friendship. Yet Austria had obtained the right to occupy two Turkish provinces without a war.
John Hunziker
Bethel College
4. A. J. P. Taylor (The English Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 229, 1943, pp. 112-113)
The Eastern crisis of 1875-8 is the best case history in diplomacy ; all the permanent elements in the relations of the great powers were displayed at one time or another. Still, so much has been written about it within the last few years that another book on the same topic is hard to justify, particularly a book of 600 pages. The account of Russian policy really adds nothing to Sumner, Russia and the Balkans ; the same sources are used and the same conclusions reached, though usually with greater effort. The Austro-Hungarian side is more valuable ; here again Dr. Rupp has been anticipated in Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans, but the latter’s account (though using almost as much unpublished Austrian material as Dr. Rupp) is very brief, so that the present book contains the first full-length account of Austro-Hungarian policy. It is unfortunate that, after the publication of Sumner, Dr. Rupp did not recast his book and make it simply the Austrian counterpart; as it is the reader has to labour through a great deal that he knows already in order to get at the development of Austro-Hungarian policy. The subject, when finally arrived at, is treated with penetration. Andrassy is shown as desiring, at bottom, to keep the Turkish empire going and only consenting to the occupation of Bosnia as a lesser evil than a South Slav state ; the court and the military leaders had no national scruples and resented Andrassy’s interference with their forward policy. On the other hand, Andrassy— with Magyar outlook—contemplated in 1878 a war with Russia, and was prevented by the military party. As a result Austro-Hungarian policy ran into difficulties and presented at the crisis a misleading air of hesitation and failure. Dr. Rupp condemns Andrassy, because he had to wait for Germany and England to get him out of his mess ; but surely there was nothing else he could do, and he did it very well. He could not agree to Russia’s Balkan gains, and internal conflicts prevented his going to war ; as it was, by bluff and delay, he secured both the undoing of San Stefano and the barring of a South Slav state. It is true that he would have preferred not even to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina ; but this defeat had been imposed upon him (by Habsburg ambitions and Turkish weakness) as early as 1875, and he knew there was no escaping it.
The main theme is Austro-Russian relations, and they are treated fully. Dr. Rupp also explains at length why Bismarck refused to help Russia against Austria-Hungary; surely the importance of Austria-Hungary in Bismarck’s system is so obvious that there is no need to labour the point. Bismarck’s later stories of his alliance offers to Russia are clearly misleading —there was no conceivable price Russia could pay which would make up for the destruction of Austria-Hungary. Usually Dr. Rupp recognizes this, though occasionally he writes as though there was something serious in these offers. In his introduction he talks of ‘ the bad state of Russo-German relations due to the struggle between German and Russian economic interests ’, but this factor (rightly) never appears again. It is a pious gesture to the current fashion which tries to make out that economic conflicts determine the policy of the great powers ; in fact, except on the one point of Austria-Hungary, relations between Germany and Russia remained excellent until 1914, as again after 1918.
Austro-Hungarian policy, like Russian policy, was largely determined by internal considerations. Sumner gave a long first chapter on ‘ The Russian Background ’; and this book lacks a similar account of the complicated political situation in Austria-Hungary, which the reader has to guess from short references and a three-page appendix on Austrian parties. Even the constant use of ‘ Austria ’ for the Habsburg monarchy obscures the partnership between the dynasty and the Magyars, expressed in ‘ Austria-Hungary ’, a term pedantic perhaps but unavoidable, especially with a Hungarian as foreign minister. Some of the references to internal politics do not inspire confidence. Thus, on page 64, it is implied that the Hohenwart programme of 1871 aimed at reconciling both Czechs and Poles ; in fact the Polish demands were satisfied by the German anti-Czech government, and the Poles, instead of being a ‘ Slav minority ’, became one of the dominant races. Again, what is one to make of the sentence : ‘ The German bourgeoisie in Austria therefore were forced to guarantee the dominance of the Hungarian nobility in Hungary and in return and as a reward received a constitution, the Dualism of 1867, which gave Austria a fantastic predominance in the Austrian half of the Empire ’ ? Most of this does not make sense, and what makes sense is wrong. Baffling also is the statement about the Austrian workers : ‘ led by Lassalle, they demanded a common franchise ’.
The style makes no concessions to the reader. Like much diplomatic history it fails to escape from the jargon of the official correspondence. Typical sentence : ‘ In early September news reached Langenau from Livadia that one there was not disinclined to make the refusal of an armistice an occasion for going to war ’. After reading this book one is not disinclined to insist on a close season for the crisis of 1875-8. In fact nothing short of the opening of the Russian archives will be an excuse for reviving the subject.
A. J. P. Taylor.
5. Walter G. Wirthwein (The American Historical Review, Vol. 48, 2, 1943, pp. 334-335)
“For Russian-Austrian relations, the Congress of Berlin was anti-climax; anticlimax and the divorce court.” That fate might have been averted had the Dreikaiserbund, solidly united within itself, unreservedly sanctioned an aggressive, joint advance into the Balkans and co-operated in imposing a durable settlement. At Reichstadt laurel, not ashes, had been envisaged by Gorchakov and Andrassy.
The national urge of South Slavs, Pan-Slav intrigues designed to further the project of a Balkan federation under Russian aegis, coupled with the economic interests and desire for salvage of Austria after her reverses in Italy and Germany, contributed to bring the Eastern Question again to the fore when the Ottoman sultan failed to curb promptly a minor insurrection of the summer of 1875 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Andrassy note, the Berlin memorandum, and the Serb-Montenegrin plunge into war with Turkey were the preludes to the Russo-Austrian “friendly, oral accord” contemplating aggrandizement, arrived at in the Bohemian castle of Reichstadt, July 8, 1876. Thereafter, in orderly detail, A Wavering Friendship presents in excellent manner the imponderables which prompted the policies of the separate states comprising the Dreikaiserbund and checked the fruition of the dreams of Reichstadt.
The foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy was “dictated” by Francis Joseph. In that, Dr. Rupp endorses Redlich’s views. The emperor “was the driver and held the reins; Andrassy was the horse” (p. 73). Both considered it a matter of vital concern that the Habsburg realm acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina. Francis Joseph desired the provinces as a practical step in the aggrandizement of his royal house; the Dalmatian coast must obtain its necessary hinterland. Andrassy, “like all true Hungarians, wished to keep the Slavs in their places and to maintain the Magyar supremacy over them” (p. 75). Above all, Austria could not permit the erection on her borders of a great South-Slav state, either under Serbia as Piedmont of the Balkans or under the sway of Russia, since the very existence of the Dual Monarchy would thereby be seriously endangered. By the Budapest conventions of January and March, 1877, “the establishment of a great compact Slavic or other State” was definitely excluded, and contemplated territorial changes were more specific than in the earlier Reichstadt agreement. Austria remained loyal to her commitments throughout the ensuing Russo-Turkish conflict until Russia, flushed by victory, imposed her own terms of peace upon the Porte. Those included a Great Bulgaria extending to the Aegean. Andrassy and Francis Joseph were completely disillusioned over such high-handed, unilateral action; relations became most strained. By June, 1878, the break with Russia was “sharp and definite,” and the Congress of Berlin “did nothing to heal the chasm” (p. 535).
The Russian house had all along been divided, despite the guiding hand of Alexander II. The tsar longed to regain Bessarabia and favored a strong Balkan program. Generally, Alexander placed full confidence in his chancellor, the aged and “muddle-headed” Prince Gorchakov, but he gradually gave a more willing ear to Ignatyev, “rampant high-priest of Pan-Slavism.” Gorchakov and Ignatyev were arch-opponents and intrigued constantly against each other. Ignatyev, although ambassador at Constantinople, was not for some time even informed of the arrangements of Reichstadt and Budapest. In turn, Ignatyev frequently overstepped the instructions of Gorchakov. San Stefano marked a triumph for Ignatyev, but it also proved to be his undoing. The dire threats of Austria and Britain forced Russia to accept a “European” settlement at Berlin, which soured both chancellor and tsar.
The foregoing summary gives solely the broad theme of the author’s meticulous study. Actually, everything that touched upon Russian-Austrian relations is skillfully included. His comments on the thought and role of Bismarck, “Everybody’s Friend,” are somewhat repetitious but sound. The book contains a mine of vivid, synoptic information on the personnel engaged in Dreikaiserbund and Balkan diplomacy. It has good contemporary illustrations of the leading characters, appendixes, a well-prepared index, and a selected bibliography which evaluates the materials consulted. Dr. Rupp’s volume excels other studies in its field and merits the highest praise.
Walter G. Wirthwein
New York University
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