Refugees. The Work Of The League
C. A. Macartney
 
REFUGEES

I. THE BREAKDOWN OF RUSSIA AND THE INTERVENTION OF THE LEAGUE
 

TO trace the steps by which hundreds of thousands of Russians were turned from normal citizens into refugees without homes, without means of subsistence, without even any legal standing, would require a book in itself. The seeds of the future mass movements of population were laid even before the Russian revolution of 1917, in the fighting on the Eastern Front during the War. As the lines of the front swayed backwards and forwards, the military authorities on both sides 'evacuated' the civilian population, sometimes into the most distant parts of Russia, Austria or Germany. When the close of the War brought about the establishment of a new frontier line, it was no uncommon thing for some such 'evacuated' civilian to find himself cut off by that frontier from his former home, and himself already a refugee. Large numbers both of peasants and especially, perhaps, of Jews were in this plight in 1918; the cities of Central Europe and of Russia teemed with them. A very great number of these were from districts allotted to Poland, and inhabited by Poles, Ruthenians and White Russians. As late as September, 1921, such refugees were still

7
 

crossing the frontier, seeking their old homes, having in many cases travelled on foot or by cart, for many months, clear across Russia from the Urals or the Volga. They were almost uniformly destitute, and too often it was to be their fate to find their homes in the old theatre of war destroyed.

Those refugees who were returning to homes, or to the sites of them, did not, however, constitute the Russian refugee problem proper. The real heart of the problem lay in the social revolution effected in Russia in 1917. This social revolution, constituting as it did a revolt of the proletariat and peasants against the aristocracy and 'bourgeoisie,' resulted in the emigration from Russia of hundreds of thousands of the classes now condemned to persecution. This fact stamped upon the Russian refugee problem its peculiar characteristic—a feature which it shared with the French emigre movement at the end of the eighteenth century. A very high proportion of the Russian refugees were people formerly possessed of means; in some cases, of great wealth. Sometimes this wealth had been safely brought away, or had previously been invested outside Russia; in such cases the refugees often—especially in Western Europe—lived with a luxury which gave a false impression of the circumstances of the vast majority. For most, the very fact of their earlier ease made it doubly hard for them to earn a living in a new world which had, as a rule, nothing to offer but the harshest of manual labour. The efforts

8
 

which they made were, in the circumstances, remarkable. Dr. Nansen wrote of them:—

'In the face of their sufferings the refugees have, on the whole, made a splendid and resolute effort to save themselves from the worst results of their unhappy lot. They have shown a determination and enterprise, in trying to support themselves by their work, which is beyond all praise. Many who are entirely unaccustomed to manual labour have gone as labourers and as workmen in the most menial capacities. They have started restaurants, cafes, shops; they have sold newspapers and articles in the street. Every means by which they could earn an honest living has been attempted.'

Every person who travelled abroad immediately after the war will recognise the truth of these words. He will recall the countless theatrical and other troupes which thronged the theatres, cabarets and dancing halls of Europe, often bringing to them an unwontedly high standard of artistic performance; the gentle faces of the waitresses in the little teashops and restaurants; the cab-drivers with strangely courteous manners; the boot-black in a certain capital who wore on his busy finger a signet ring bearing one of Europe's most famous coats of arms. Every city of Central and Eastern Europe had its little colony of Russian emigres, and their struggles to preserve the remnants of the culture which they had formerly enjoyed have been often enough described. Those whose fate it was to sink straight into the ranks of manual labour,

9
 

in the factory or the mine, escaped observation; but they were even more numerous.

This more or less gradual infiltration did not constitute the whole of the Russian emigration. It might have remained within reasonable proportions, but for the struggle which went on for some years to reverse the results of the 1917 revolution: the attempts—in the case of Poland and the Baltic States successful, but elsewhere ultimately unsuccessful—of various parts of the former Russian Empire to throw off the rule of the Central Government; and above all, the further attempts, which proved uniformly unsuccessful, to reverse that government by a counter-revolution. These adventures were largely supported by the Allied Governments, especially those of France and Great Britain, and it is in very large part owing to their support of these futile interventionist movements that the Russian refugee problem reached its actual proportions.

Without going here into a history of these interventions, one may recall their broad outlines. In the spring of 1918 the Ukraine proclaimed its independence; the Cossack provinces of the South-East showed themselves indisposed to recognise any authority; and a counter-revolutionary army was assembling in Manchuria, on Russian soil. In May and June, 1918, the Czechoslovak legions practically cleared Siberia; in August, Great Britain, France, Japan and the U.S.A. gave their support, and in November Admiral Koltchak, at Omsk, proclaimed himself dictator of the

10
 

'White' Siberia. The summer of 1918 saw the Social Revolutionary coup in North Russia. In November, 1918, the French occupied Odessa. In the spring of 1919 Koltchak from Siberia, Denikin from South-Western Russia, Yudenitch from Estonia, and the British troops from Archangel made their attempts to overthrow the Russian Government. At the same time, confused fighting was going on between Poland and Russia, and the situation on the Baltic was excessively obscure. The Carelians and Ingrians, of North-Western Russia, were struggling for liberty, supported by Finland.

After initial successes, all these movements were defeated. The only nation that profited by the fighting was, strangely enough, Latvia. The British campaign in the North was wound up; Yudenitch was driven back into Poland; Denikin was repelled precipitately, and, after making a last stand at Novorossisk, on the Cuban, in December, 1919, fled to Constantinople in April, 1920. Koltchak lost Omsk in November, 1919, resigned his command in the following month, was betrayed by the Czechs and shot in March, 1920. Siberia became 'red' again soon after.

The brunt of the fighting now fell on Poland, which gained considerable successes, occupying Kiev in May, 1920. But Kiev was retaken in the following month; in August the Russian troops were within a few miles of Warsaw. Peace was not concluded till March, 1921, but Poland never seemed again likely to intervene successfully in Russian affairs.

11
 

Meanwhile, General Wrangel had reorganised the remnants of Denikin's army in South Russia, and had gained certain successes during the Polish fighting. Wrangel was strongly supported by the Allies, particularly the French. After the Polish danger lessened, the Russians turned against him; he was driven back precipitately, and in November, 1920, the bulk of his army, with some of his civilian supporters, were evacuated from the Crimean and other ports and transported to Constantinople.

During this terrible period some hundreds of thousands of refugees who had been directly engaged in, or closely connected with, the counter-revolutionary movement left Russia. The most important of these groups were the families of persons connected with Denikin's adventure, for whom the British authorities had assumed responsibility (these were at first supported mainly in Egypt and Cyprus, but afterwards transferred, through Dr. Nansen's instrumentality, to Yugoslavia, which assumed charge of them); the 'White' Russians who had thrown in their lot with the Poles in the Ukraine, or with Boris Savinkov's terrorist movement (such were General Petlura, who resided with his staff in Warsaw, while his troops were interned in concentration camps in Eastern Poland); the 20,000 or so persons who fled to Finland after the defeat of Yudenitch, the withdrawal of the British from Archangel, and later (in 1921) after the unsuccessful naval mutiny at Kronstadt; and, finally, the remnants of Wrangel's and of the Siberian forces.

12
 

The last-named groups presented particular difficulties. Some 135,000 refugees, belonging to or connected with Wrangel's force, had arrived in Constantinople simultaneously. Of these, 90-100,000 were soldiers, who maintained their political and military organisation. General Wrangel persisted in regarding himself as a Government, and had not lost hope of making a renewed intervention in Russia. He therefore tried to keep his forces and Government concentrated as far as possible, and opposed every effort to disperse them. Thus when France secured from Brazil an offer to take 20,000 settlers, and Peru 1,000, Wrangel prevented his men from leaving.

France, on the other hand, maintained that the evacuation of the Crimea had been carried out without her authority, or even knowledge, and that she was therefore not responsible for the condition of the refugees. She withdrew recognition from General Wrangel as a Government, and proposed to treat his soldiers as civilian refugees, which involved their early disbandment. A long struggle went on between Wrangel and the French authorities. Wrangel consented, under pressure, to reduce his army by 32,000 men, by means of disbanding the unfit, granting long leave to officers of high rank and persons possessed of private means, and demobilising the natives of Poland and other countries which no longer formed part of the Russian Empire. France offered facilities for repatriation to all those desiring it (only 3,300 soldiers, however, took advantage of this offer);

13
 

sent the crews of the ships—about 6,000 men—to Biserta, and enlisted some 3,000 in the Foreign Legion; and prevailed on the Yugoslav Government to receive 22,000 persons, civil and military, while Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania took some 7,000 others. The remainder were concentrated in concentration camps, the largest of which, containing over 20,000 refugees, was in Gallipoli. The Tuzla camp, containing some 3,000 refugees, was in charge of the British.

Although repudiating responsibility, France had 'from motives of humanity ' undertaken the maintenance of the refugees, although she made repeated efforts to cut off her supplies. By August, 1921, France's expenditure had already exceeded 150,000,000 francs, and was then proceeding at the rate of 4,000,000 francs monthly. Even with these subsidies, conditions were so bad that refugees were found dead of starvation in the streets of Constantinople. Much help was given from other sources. The rank and file of the British troops of occupation, of their own initiative, started relief work. The British Government advanced £20,000. At one time the British Relief was feeding 10,000 persons a day, and the American Relief 17,500. The American Red Cross devoted 500,000 dollars to this work, and the Save the Children Fund and other organisations gave large sums. The burden was, however, greater than could be borne. Even after, in September, 1921, France suddenly and secretly transported the inhabitants of the Gallipoli

14
 

camp to Bulgaria, there still remained in or around Constantinople some 40,000 Russians, most of them in a state of destitution and faced with the prospect of the closing down of the relief organisations and the cessation of the French supplies.

The second focus of extreme misery was in the Far East; this problem, however, became acute rather later than that of Constantinople. Some time before December, 1922 about 22,000 Russians, remnants of Koltchak's force and others, had fled from Vladivostock and established themselves on the east coast of Korea, in China and in Japan. An even greater number entered China in the autumn of 1923, while many others entered Northern Korea. In 1924 it was estimated that there were over 20,000 in China, of whom some two-thirds were in Manchuria and most of the remainder in the Northern Provinces of China proper. Most of these were men, and a great number had been in arms against the Soviet Government. Only about 10 per cent, were women and children.

Generous relief was given at first by the Chinese and Korean Governments, and by charitable organisations; but this ceased after a time. In 1924 Dr. Nansen's representative reported:— 'The conditions under which the refugees are existing are pitiable in the extreme. For the most part they have insufficient clothing and no money. They are living on doles of money and on intermittent employment of a most precarious nature. The houses where they lodge and the underclothing they wear are

15
 

indescribably dirty. Medical assistance is only available in large towns and medical supplies are most inadequate. Overcrowding is a constant menace to the health of the communities where they are. Their inability to speak the Chinese language and the rigorous winters of Manchuria, where most of them are, make their lot an exceedingly hard one. It is noteworthy that comparatively few acts of violence have occurred; their stoical endurance is amazing. The fact that nearly all the men have had military training and have served in the army partly explains it. Nevertheless, it is remarkable.'

Many took service in the contending Chinese armies. Others undertook the lowest form of coolie labour—a fate of indescribable misery, when the difference between the normal European and Chinese standards of living is considered. Others carried on a nomadic, semi-independent existence on the frontiers of Russia. Their difficulties were increased by the fact that China was one of the last countries to adopt the system of refugee passports subsequently introduced. The refugees in China were thus completely immobilised, although here, exceptionally, a large number of them were agriculturists who could have earned their living easily, given the opportunity. As it was, as late as 1925, the position of the Russians in China was described as i more difficult than in any other part of the world.'

Apart from these storm-centres, the chief congested areas were the countries bordering

16
 

on Russia on the West, the Balkan States and Germany. In particular, enormous numbers of refugees entered Poland and Roumania, by train or on foot. Some of these belonged to the categories mentioned above, but a great number, who continued to cross the frontiers in 1919, 1920 and 1921, belonged to a different class. Many of them were peasants from the famine areas of Russia, who left their country, quite simply, in search of a less dubious future. Polish sources estimated that between 600,000 and 900,000 entered Poland, largely during the famine period. It seems, however, that not more than about 120,000 took up their homes in Poland. Great numbers passed through to Germany; others were later found to be Polish subjects from White Russia and East Galicia. Similarly, many of the 100,000 refugees who entered Roumania proved to be Bessarabians. Many other immigrants into Roumania and Poland were Jews who fled as a result of the anti-Semitic disturbances in the Ukraine and elsewhere which marked a certain phase of the Soviet revolutions. Probably well over 30,000 such Jews entered Roumania. An interesting class of immigrants into Germany consisted of some 45,000 emigrants from the German colonies of the Volga, the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Ukraine and Volhynia. Some of these returned subsequently to Russia; but a fresh influx (on a smaller scale) occurred as late as 1929, when a large party of (German) Memnonites left Russia for Germany.

17
 

The Baltic States "harboured large numbers. Latvia and Estonia each had some 20,000; Finland 31,000, of whom 12,000 were Carelians or Finns, the remainder Russians who had crossed the frontier singly or after the failure of various counter-revolutionary attempts in North Russia. Czechoslovakia, which showed itself particularly generous towards certain Ukrainian formations, had 25,000. Bulgaria was exceedingly generous, particularly in accepting refugees from Constantinople, and the number of refugees within its frontier at one time reached 35,000, while Yugoslavia maintained some 50,000 ex-soldiers. Even in Greece, with its own severe refugee problem, there were at one time many thousands of Russians.

The total number of refugees has been estimated as high as 2,100,000; but the figure more commonly given is 1,500,000. Of these, in the first period, about 70,000 were in the Far East; perhaps 150,000 in and around Constantinople; fully 600,000 in Germany; and nearly all the remainder (although there was from the first a substantial French contingent) in Poland, Roumania, the Baltic and Balkan States, and Czechoslovakia. The further west one went, the fewer were the refugees, Austria and Hungary each harboured several thousands; Italy only some 1,500; Spain only one.

It is difficult to say how these refugees lived during the first years of their exile. Some found temporary employment in the manner described above. Some were employed in public works.

18
 

In Bulgaria, for example, which was suffering from a shortage of man-power, they were used on the roads and in the State mines. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia found room for many refugees in their administrative and other services. Yugoslavia, and perhaps other States, enlisted many Russians in its army, Poland kept large numbers in concentration camps.

Very large sums were spent on supporting the refugees by Governments and private charitable organisations, such as the Red Cross, the Save the Children Fund, etc. The Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments alone spent some 20,000,000 gold francs annually on their refugees. But the work thus done, although most admirable, was largely ineffectual. There wras overlapping and lack of co-ordination; moreover, the heart of the problem, which was to distribute the refugees throughout the world where the world could make use of them, was left untouched. Dr. Nansen was fully justified in complaining that the funds expended on temporary relief work would, if systematically employed, have sufficed to place most of the refugees capable of earning their living in productive employment, and thus practically solve the whole problem. [*]

But to organise such a work an international authority was needed. It could not be expected that the harassed, impoverished and mutually
 

*. Even as late as 1925 it was estimated that the annual cost incurred by the European Governments in supporting their unemployed and helpless refugees was £2,000,000.

19
 

suspicious post-war Governments could successively carry through the immense amount of bi-lateral negotiations necessary to transfer the refugees from centres of congestion to countries where labour was needed. This work could only succeed if undertaken internationally, and on a broad scale.

The position of the refugees was furthermore immensely complicated by the fact that the great majority of them possessed no legal status whatever. Most of them had fled without any papers of identity; others possessed papers issued by Governments which no longer existed. The Soviet Government refused to recognise them so long as they, in their turn, refused to return within the frontiers; although willing to accept the registration, in Warsaw and elsewhere, of such refugees from the famine-stricken areas as accepted the Soviet system and were prepared to return to Russia. This absence of papers constituted one of the chief handicaps under which the refugees laboured. Although some States, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, issued papers of their own to refugees on their soil, these commanded no international recognition, and the refugees were thus immobilised in the country in which they found themselves. No country, in European post-war conditions, was willing to admit unidentified and destitute aliens, and least of all Russians, who might prove to be secret emissaries of the Third International.

20
 

Here was another problem which could only be solved by international action; and the need for some such systematic and comprehensive plan became increasingly felt as time went on. The efforts of the relief organisations could not be sustained for ever, and the poorer Governments themselves complained of the unfair burden to which they were put, which was not equally shared by other and wealthier countries; for the countries which were supporting the bulk of the refugees were precisely those which had themselves suffered most grievously from the World War.

In these circumstances, it was natural that the world should look to the League, and, above all, to the man who had successfully carried through the not dissimilar task of repatriating the prisoners of war from a score of countries.

On February 20,1921, the International Red Cross Committee, with the other great charitable organisations, asked the Council to appoint a League Commissioner, as 'the only super-national political authority capable of solving a problem which is beyond the power of exclusively humanitarian organisations,' to supervise the work in connection with Russian refugees, define their legal position, organise their employment, and, 'above all, their repatriation,' and to co-ordinate the efforts of the charitable organisations.

The Council, after consulting Governments, decided in June, 1921, to appoint a High Commissioner. He was not himself to administer direct relief, but to make the refugees self-

21
 

supporting by dispersing them in countries where they could live and work, and to coordinate the efforts of others. A small sum was granted for administrative purposes (£1,500 up to the end of the budgetary year, 1921, £4,000 for the succeeding year). It was suggested that further funds might perhaps be obtained from Russian Governmental funds in Europe.

At the end of August, 1921, Dr. Nansen was appointed High Commissioner.

Meanwhile, Conferences of ten interested Governments, besides certain charitable organisations, met in Geneva in August and September. They recommended that a census of the refugees, classified by professions, should be undertaken by the International Labour Organisation. Identity papers and travelling facilities for the refugees should be provided. Governments should give the I.L.O. information regarding the possibility of employment within their frontiers and, if possible, relax immigration restrictions. Assistance should be given to any Russian desiring repatriation, but no compulsion applied. These recommendations were circulated to Governments.

In the meantime, although the relief of immediate distress was not to be part of his normal duties, Dr. Nansen was empowered to take special measures to deal with the acute situation in Constantinople, where the French Government and the American Red Cross had announced that they would be obliged to cut off their supplies.

22
 

The success with which Dr. Nansen was able to cope with this crisis was largely due to the co-operation of the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople, and in particular of Sir Samuel Hoare. While France generously reversed her decision, and agreed to continue feeding Wrangel's army until it could be evacuated, Sir Samuel Hoare prevailed on the British Government to answer an appeal issued by Dr. Nansen, and to make a special grant of £20,000. A League of Nations Office was established in Constantinople to coordinate the work of relief and to undertake the dispersal of the refugees. A further sum of £26,700 was raised (of which the British Government subscribed £10,000) to pay for the transport expenses of the dispersal.

The work of dispersal began immediately, thanks to the very generous attitude of a number of Governments. Czechoslovakia received 1,000 students, 2,000 agriculturists, and a number of children. Bulgaria took in the inmates of the Gallipoli camp, and others. Well-to-do refugees were allowed to settle in Western Europe. Russians who could claim the nationality of the new Border States were allowed to go home. 600 Russian Jews were sent to Palestine, and 1,500 Siberians to Vladivostock.

By the time that the main work of dispersal had been finished, the able-bodied men had been dispersed to no less than 44 countries, including the United States, Canada, Palestine and many European countries. Most of them,

23
 

however, had moved into countries adjacent to Constantinople, notably Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece. A considerable number of Russians had preferred to remain in Constantinople, where they had found work. When in 1924 the Russian Embassy and Consulate in Constantinople were handed over to the Soviet authorities, the local office of the High Commissioner took over semi-official protection of the refugees. Not the least important, nor the least difficult, part of the work of this office consisted in persuading the Turkish Government to reverse or suspend successive decrees expelling the Russians, or depriving them of work. Meanwhile, groups were sent away, as occasion offered. In 1927, the Turkish Government having again decided to expel the remnants, a special appeal was made once more to the generosity of the American charitable organisations, which contributed no less than 100,000 dollars. With this money 4,700 Russians, including most of the invalids, were evacuated. Of the 1,400 who remained in Constantinople in September, 1929, 1,000 had applied for Turkish nationality; arrangements had been made for the settlement of 200 in Palestine, and many of the remaining 200 had been offered contracts in Brazil or France.

The High Commissioner's Office in Constantinople played a second and most important part in the earlier days of its existence. When, in September, 1922, the frightful Greek disaster took place, and Constantinople was invaded successively, in a short space of time,

24
 

by no less than 75,000 Turks and 130,000 Greeks and Armenians—among whom, to increase the horror, smallpox was raging—the Constantinople Office was empowered, as an emergency measure, to extend the benefits of its service to these refugees. It is impossible to calculate how much misery was averted by the providential existence of this office, with its experience and its organisation, in the terrible centre of Constantinople; but its work in this connection must be described under a separate heading. It must, however, be remarked that while it was possible to arrange separate settlement schemes for the Greeks and, later, for the Bulgarians, it was found necessary to include the Armenians, for whom the solution of repatriation proved impracticable, within Dr. Nansen's general refugee settlement work, which must now be described.


[Previous] [Next]
[Back to Index]